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Implication of Civil Remedies Under the Indian Civil Rights 
Act 
The field of American Indian law is complex and, to the uniniti-
ated, often startling. Prior to 1968, for example, no person, whether 
or not he was an Indian, could sue an Indian government in federal 
court for the deprivation of his civil rights.1 However, in that year 
the Indian Civil Rights Act2 (ICRA) prohibited tribes from infring .. 
ing upon certain enumerated rights, similar to those in the Bill of 
Rights and the fourteenth amendment, 3 and expressly provided that 
1. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (no federal court habeas corpus 
review of Indian court conviction); Native American Church v. Navajo Tribe, 272 
F.2d 131, 134 (10th Cir. 1959) (first amendment does not apply to Indian govern-
ments); Barta v. Oglala Sioux, 259 F.2d 553, 556-67 (8th Cir. 1958) (fourteenth 
amendment limitations on state action do not apply to Indian governments). See also 
Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200, 203 (9th Cir. 1973). 
However, a possible ground for federal court review of Tribal infringement of 
civil rights has always existed. If there is sufficient federal involvement with a 
tribal government, the restrictions of the Bill of Rights might be applied to the 
tribal government's actions. See Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 
1965); text at notes 112-26 infra. 
2. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1970) (amended 1974). In addition to guaranteeing 
various civil rights for Indians, ICRA directs the Secretary of the Interior to draft a 
"model code to govern the administration of justice by courts of Indian offenses on 
Indian reservations," 25 U.S.C. § 1311 (1970), and establishes a mechanism by which 
jurisdiction over Indians previously assumed by states may be retroceded to the 
federal government. 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (1970). The Act also requires Indian con-
sent to any further state assumptions of jurisdiction over Indians. 25 U.S.C. §§ 
1321-22 (1970). 
3. 25 u.s.c. § 1302 (1970): 
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances; 
(2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue 
warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing 
to be seized; 
(3) subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy; 
( 4) compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; 
(5) taken any private property for a public use without just compensation; 
(6) deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and 
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to 
have the assistance of counsel for his defense; 
(7) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual 
_punishments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any 
penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months 
or a fine of $500 or both; 
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its 
laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process 
ofllaw; 
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or 
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persons detained by an Indian government in violation of the Act 
could bring a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 4 Several courts 
have subsequently gone considerably further and found that ICRA 
also impliedly created a federal civil remedy for violation of the rights 
guaranteed by the Act. 5 
This Note will discuss neither -the wisdom of the express provisions 
of ICRA nor the desirability of express creation by Congress of a 
federal civil remedy. 6 The purpose of this Note is, instead, ,to analyze 
(10) deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment 
the right, upon request, to a trial by jury or not less than six persons. 
ICRA varies from the Bill of Rights in three significant respects: the establish-
ment of religion is not prohibited, the right to counsel is guaranteed only at the 
defendant's own expense, and an Indian government is prohibited from denying "equal 
protection of its laws," 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970), while the fourteenth amendment 
prohibits states from denying "equal protection of the laws." 
In addition, ICRA's provisions have not been interpreted to create precisely the 
same rights and duties as the similarly worded provisions of the Bill of Rights. See 
Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079, 1082 (8th 
Cir. 1975); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 1973); Yellow Bird 
v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 380 F. Supp. 438, 440 (D.S.D. 1974); text at notes 18-19 
infra. 
4. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970): "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall 
be available to any person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his 
detention by order of an Indian tribe." 
5. See, e.g., Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 933 (10th 
Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200, 202 (9th 
Cir. 1973); Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1973); Solomon v. 
LaRose, 335 F. Supp. 715, 721 (D. Neb. 1971); Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 
370, 372 (D.N.M. 1971); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969). Contra, 
e.g., Pinnow v. Shoshone Tribal Council, 314 F. Supp. 1157, 1160 (D. Wyo. 1970), 
affd. sub nom., Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971). 
6. ICRA seeks to accommodate the civil rights of individual Indians with the 
right of Indian nations to self-determination and self-government. In striking a 
balance between these countervailing interests, Congress provided for the enforce-
ment of Indian civil rights in the federal courts only to the extent of habeas 
corpus actions; express civil remedies were apparently viewed as incompatible 
with the self-determination of Indian nations, or at least as not crucial to the pro-
tection of civil rights. See generally text at notes 127-77 infra. 
It is obviously possible to disagree with the precise balance of interests struck in 
ICRA. Thus, one view may be that because Indians are United States citizens, the 
federal government is responsible for protecting their individual rights, even 
against- Indian governments. From this perspective, enforcement provisions of 
ICRA may appear inadequate and the express creation of civil remedies necessary. 
See generally Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484 F.2d 200, 203 (9th 
Cir. 1973) (implying a civil remedy because the "Indian Civil Rights Act creates a 
substantive body of rights . • . to 'extricate the individual Indian' from decisions 
holding a controversy between an Indian and his tribal government . . . an internal 
controversy"). 
On the other hand, ICRA may be viewed as essentially paternalistic legislation 
that interferes with the self-government of Indians. From this perspective, not 
only the proposed creation of express civil remedies but also the express habeas corpus 
provisions presently in ICRA would be rejected. See Coulter, Federal Law and 
Indian Tribal Law: The Right to Civil Counsel and the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights, 
3 CoLUM. SURVEY OF HUMAN RIGHTS L. RBv. 49, 50 (1971) (''The Indians view 
Congress' action as a further weakening of Indian self-government in the name of pro-
tecting Indians from their own people. They see the Indian Bill of Rights as another 
imposition by a white government of white standards, values, and governmental 
212 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:210 
the bases upon which remedies have been implied by federal 
courts and to question whether implication is consistent with standards 
of statutory interpretation appropriate for Indian law. It is contended 
that the implication of federal civil remedies against Indian govern-
ments is improper and that if such remedies are to be created, prece-
dent and policy mandate that they be the product of Congress. The 
Note will first briefly examine the potential impact that the implica-
tion of civil remedies may :have upon Indian government and will 
then summarize the analytical deficiencies of those federal cases in 
which such remedies have actually ,been implied. The remainder of 
-the Note will, in some detail, outline and discuss a proposed frame-
work for judicial analysis of the implication of remedies in the field 
of Indian law. 
The substantial impact that implied civil remedies may have upon 
Indian culture is evident from a survey of Indian practices that have 
been challenged in suits under ICRA. In making this review, it is 
essential to keep in mind that while the legal principles upon which 
ICRA claims are based have a solid foundation in the Anglo-
. American tradition, Indian nations have -been guided for centuries by 
fundamentally different customs, mores, and legal practices. Any 
attempt, however well-intentioned, to force Indian institutions into 
the Anglo-American mold invites the danger that tribal governments 
long held legitimate by the Indian ,people will be altered beyond recog-
nition. This potential for the radical alteration of cherished insti-
tutions is shown in Dodge v. Nakai. 1 In that case, the federal district 
court allowed a civil suit charging violations of the free speech, 8 due 
process, 9 and bill of attainder10 provisions of ICRA to challenge a 
Navajo Advisory Committee order excluding a non-Indian employee 
from the reservation for excessive meddling in Navajo politics and 
for showing disrespect to the Committee. The court invalidated the 
order upon a finding that the Committee, which is vested with both 
legislative and judicial power, had failed to conduct itself like a 
"judicial" body11 and that -the punishment did not fit the offense.12 
This ruling, based as it is on Anglo-American legal principles, not 
only opens -the substantive tribal law to challenge but also allows the 
federal court to scrutinze ·both the structure and procedures of the 
traditional Indian governments. The result in Dodge is nothing less 
than a judgment on the validity of •the tribal government itself; the 
theory upon once sovereign tribes"). See also AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYERS As-
SOCIATION, THE ICRA-FIVB YEARS LATER 61 (1973); V. DELORIA, OF UTMosr 
GOOD FArm 221 (1971); W. WASHBURN, THB INDIAN IN AMERICA 272 (1975). 
7. 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969). · 
8. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (1970) reprinted in note 3 supra. 
9. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970) reprinted in note 3 supra. 
10. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(9) (1970) reprinted in note 3 supra. 
11. 298 F. Supp. at 33-34. 
12. See 298 F. Supp. at 31-32. 
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Navajos were apparently given the choice of transforming their in-
stitutions and practices or facing litigation in federal courts to enjoin 
their activities. 
Other provisions of ICRA also portend substantial incursions 
upon Indian cultur:e if civil actions based on these provisions continue 
to be recognized. Federal enforcement of the prohibition on the 
taking of private property without just compensation13 could under-
mine ithe basic principles of property ownership held by many Indian 
nations.14 Many rights -and privileges in some tribes that -are based 
upon matrilineal15 and patrilineal16 traditions would be subject to 
challenge on equal protection grounds.17 The refusal of tribal gov-
ernments to allow Indians to use Indian land may be challenged on 
ICRA due process grounds.18 Although :the courts have uniformly 
held that the statutory rights of equal protection and due process in 
ICRA are not coextensive with the similarly worded provisions of 
the fifth and fourteenth amendments, 19 some federal courts have 
applied these rights outside the criminal justice context.20 Indian 
election procedures, 21 apportionment, 22 and land use controls, 28 all 
of which are directly related to the structure of Indian society, have 
13. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(5) (1970) reprinted in note 3 supra. 
14. Indian property is commonly owned by the tribe, not by individual Indians. 
See Crowe v. Eastern Bank of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1236 (4th Cir. 
1974); Seneca Constitutional Rights Org. v. George, 348 F. Supp. 50, 59 (W.D.N.Y. 
1972). This system of property ownership could be seriously undermined if 
termination of tribal land leases or assignments to individual Indians gave rise 
to claims for compensation cognizable in federal courts, which are insensitive to 
Indian culture. Leaving non-habeas enforcement of the substantive provisions of 
section 1302 to Indian courts, see text at notes 154-59 infra, insures an accommodation 
of Indian culture with the civil rights guaranteed by ICRA. 
15. Many New York tribes follow a matrilineal tradition of inheritance. See 
G. SNYDERMAN, BEHIND nm TREE OF PEACE, A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF IROQUOIS 
WARFARE (1948). 
16. Tribal membership is often based on patrilineal criteria. See Martinez 
v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975). See also Jacobson v. Forest 
County Potawatomi Community, 389 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. Wis. 1974). 
17. ICRA contains an equal protection provision. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) 
(1970); note 3 supra. 
18. See Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 
1975). For the due process provision of ICRA, see 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970); 
note 3 supra. 
19. See, e.g., Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 
1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 1975); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 
1973); Yellow Bird v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 380 F. Supp. 438, 440 (D.S.D. 1974). 
20. See cases cited note 5 supra. 
21. Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079 
(8th Cir. 1975); Williams v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal Council, 387 F. Supp. 
1194 (D.S.D. 1975); White v-. Tribal Council, 383 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1974); 
McCUrdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973), revd., 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 
1974). 
22. Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1973); Daly v. United 
States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973). 
23. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975). 
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also been challenged in civil suits based on these newly established 
civil rights. · 
The federal courts that have implied civil remedies under ICRA 
have used a deficient analytical framework. First, while ,these courts 
have ,properly assumed jurisdiction for such claims on federal question 
grounds, 24 they have not adequately explained their assumption of 
jurisdiction on grounds of the general grant over oases arising under 
civil rights acts. 25 Second, in their haste to reach the merits of a 
case, the courts have confused the presence of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion with the existence of a cause of action, despite the fact that a 
grant of jurisdiction, even if it is explicit, does not automatically 
create grounds for the implication of civil actions and remedies. 20 
24. E.g., Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17, 21-25 (D. Ariz. 1968) (jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) ). The leading case of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 
(1946), holds that, where a complaint in federal court is drawn to seek recovery 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the court must entertain the 
suit. 327 U.S. at 681-82. The only exceptions, where the alleged claim appears to 
be either immaterial or frivolous, 327 U.S. at 682, are inapposite to claims for 
relief under ICRA. One final problem, however, is whether ICRA claims have a 
matter in controversy that exceeds $10,000, as is required by section 1331. The 
general rule is that courts must not dismiss an action unless they can hold that, as a 
.legal certainty, the plaintiffs at final hearing will be unable to justify the jurisdic-
tional claims which they have pleaded. Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047, 1052 (3d 
Cir. 1972). Although a virtual presumption of jurisdictional amount has been 
attributed to such fundamental rights as free speech, see Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. 
Supp. 797, 810 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), valuation of other rights protected by ICRA may 
be a matter for case-by-case determination. 
25. See, e.g., Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17, 25 (D. Ariz. 1968) (juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970)). Section 1343(4) provides: "The dis-
trict courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be 
commenced by any person . . . to recover damages or to secure equitable or other 
relief under any Act of Congress providing. for the protection of civil rights, in-
cluding the right to vote." (emphasis added). If read literally, the statute requires 
that a civil action be authorized by law before jurisdiction can be granted; thus, 
the absence of express civil remedies in ICRA would appear to preclude federal 
court jurisdiction over Indians under section 1343(4). The courts, however, with 
virtually no explication, have used an analytically dubious "bootstrap" approach by 
first ·using this provision to obtain jurisdiction in the absence of civil actions au-
thorized by law and, after finding jurisdiction, then declaring that civil actions and 
remedies must be implied to effectuate the purpose of the statute. This approach 
has been both condemned, see Zionitz, In Defense of Tribal Sovereignty: An 
Analysis of Judicial Error in Construction of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 20 
S.D. L. R.Ev. I, 36-38 (1975), and endorsed, see Comment, The Indian Bill of 
Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 
1372-73 (1969). It is hoped that courts faced with the problem in the future will 
explain more fully their assumption of jurisdiction. 
26. See M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 749 (1973). For an example 
of the distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and a claim for relief, see 
Turner v. United States and Creek Nations, 248 U.S. 354 (1919) (special act of 
Congress authorizing Court of Claims to render judgment as law and equity may 
require in the claim of Clarence W. Turner did not create a substantive right to 
recover on the claim absent specific legislation creating a cause of action). See 
also Zionitz, supra note 25, at 29-33. 
Thus, to state that federal courts have jurisdiction over all civil actions found 
to arise under possible implications of ICRA in no way settles the essential question 
November 1976] Implication of Civil Remedies 215 
Finally, the courts have failed to consider adequately the impact of 
their decisions on Indian society, though such a consideration should 
be part of any judicial implication of rights in the field of Indian laiw. 
The -two Supreme Court cases upon which cour,ts have primarily 
relied to imply civil remedies, Jones v. Mayer27 and Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Agents, 28 are not compelling authority for the implication 
of remedies under ICRA. The decision in Mayer empowered a district 
court to fashion remedies for civil rights violations notwithstanding 
the lack of an express remedy in the statute.29 Clearly, then, the 
absence of an express remedy does not prohibit a federal court from 
fashioning appropriate equitable relief. 30 However, · this in no way 
delineates the criteria by which a federal court should determine what 
remedies may ibe appropriate nor is it -a mandate to fashion remedies 
notwithstanding countervailing policy considerations. The Jones 
Court clearly refrained from deciding the circumstances under which 
certain remedies might be implied. 31 
In Bivens, which is also frequently cited by lower courts, 32 the 
Supreme Court held that a cause of action for damages was sustain-
able against a federal official who, under color o~ l_aw, carried on 
of whether it is appropriate for federal courts to imply civil actions under ICRA 
at all. 
27. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
28. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
29. See 392 U.S. at 412 n.1: "To vindicate their rights [under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 § 1,] 42 U.S.C. § 1982 [(1970)], the petitioners invoked the 
jurisdiction of the District Court to award 'damages or ... equitable or other • 
relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights . • . .' 
28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) {(1970)]." It is arguable that civil actions not expressly pro-
vided for by statute are not civil actions authorized by law so as to come within 
the jurisdictional grant of section 1343(4). See note 25 supra. If this is true, 
then the Court above passes over a number of steps in going from the rights 
articulated in section 1982, which provides for no express civil actions, to the 
jurisdiction granted in section 1343 ( 4) to award civil remedies. The Court should 
have declared that a complaint requesting implied civil relief under section 1982 comes 
within the jurisdiction of federal courts under the federal question jurisdiction of 
section 1331. Having jurisdiction over the suit, the Court should have then deter-
mined that section 1982 implies the use of civil actions to enforce the rights created. 
This would have imparted "legal authorization" to civil suits under section 1982 
bringing them within the federal court. The quoted footnote in Mayer, then, 
only supports the proposition that if civil actions are properly implied under a 
statute, federal courts have jurisdiction to grant a civil remedy under section 
1343(4). The case is not support for the proposition that all federal civil 
rights statutes, due to section 1343(4), imply the use of civil actions for their 
enforcement. The criteria by which civil actions are to be implied from civil rights 
statutes were not articulated by the Mayer court. See text at note 31 infra. 
30. 392 U.S. at 414 n.13: "The fact that [the Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1,] 
42 U.S.C. § 1982 [(1970)], is couched in declaratory terms and provides no explicit 
method of enforcement does not, of course, prevent a federal court from fashioning 
an effective equitable remedy [under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970)]." See note 29 
supra. 
31. 392 U.S. at 414 n.14. 
32. See, e.g., Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D.N.M. 1971). 
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unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of a person's fourth 
amendment rights.33 Bivens is even less apposite than Mayer as a 
source of •authority for implication of civil remedies under ICRA for 
-at least two reasons. First, the Bivens Court was implying a remedy 
for a constitutional violation. Congress had neither provided for 
nor apparently even considered any remedies for such violations. In 
cases arising under ICRA, in contrast, the rights are statutorily based; 
Congress deliberated on the question of remedies and expressly settled 
on only one-habeas corpus. Moreover, aggrieved parties are not 
left without a means of redress, since they may also maintain an action 
in tribal courts. 34 Whether additional remedies should be implied 
is dependent upon a construction of the statutory rights contained in 
ICRA, which rights are clearly not coextensive with those guaran-
teed by the Constitution. 35 
Courts attempting to use Bivens as authority for implication. of 
ICRA remedies have also failed to note the express qualification of 
the Bivens Court itself that the case involved "no special factors 
counselling hesitation [in implying a remedy] in the absence of affirm.: 
ative action by Congress."36 There are, indeed, "special factors" in 
the area of Indian law that counsel against implication of civil reme-
dies and which in fact suggest that such implication actually violates 
the Court's intention in Bivens. These factors are the special status 
of Indians within the American legal system and the impact of civil 
suits on the ability of Indians to govern themselves. Concern for 
Indian self-government is well established in our law. First, many 
Indian nations have treaties with the United States that guarantee 
them the right of self-government, 37 and the precedent in Indian law 
is clear that although Congress may unilaterally modify the terms of 
a treaty,38 such modification or breach will not be lightly implied.30 
Despite the direct interference with the rights to self-government that 
implied civil remedies represent, courts have uniformly failed to 
investigate whether the Indian nation defending the suit possesses 
such treaty rights. Second,.Indian sovereignty is traditionally subject 
to infringement only by express congressional legislation. 40 Although 
it is possible for an Indian nation to become so related to the federal 
government that a "sovereignty" bar to implied civil actions may be-
come inapplicable, 41 the courts implying civil remedies have also 
uniformly failed to examine the issue ·of sovereignty. The failure to 
33. 403 U.S. at 389. 
34. See note 156 infra and text at notes 154-58 infra. 
35. See text at note 19 supra. 
36. 403 U.S. at 396. 
31. See text at notes 47-51 infra. 
38. See text at note 59 infra. 
39. See note 61 infra and text at notes 61-72 infra. 
40. See text at notes 83-90 infra. 
41. See text at notes 109-19 infra. 
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consider treaty rights and sovereignty is a fatal deficiency in the anal-
ysis of courts that have implied civil remedies under ICRA. 
A final shortcoming of courts that have erroneously relied on 
Mayer and Bivens is their failure to follow other current Supreme 
Court decisions not involving Indian law that establish the proper 
framework for determining when a cause of action should be implied 
from a federal statute. 42 As will ,be demonstrated below,43 even if 
no treaty rights of self-government or requisite sovereignty exist in a 
particular case to create a bar to implication of rnmedies, a proper 
consideration of the legislative history of ICRA indicates that a civil 
cause of action should generally not be implied. 
A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
The a:bove factors indicate that a court confronted with a civil 
suit based on ICRA should adopt the following analysis. It should 
first determine whether the defendant Indian nation possesses either 
a treaty that guarantees the right of self-government or a requisite 
degree of sovereignty. If the finding is affirmative, the court, in 
construing ICRA, should adhere to a long line of precedent holding 
that a statute in conflict with treaty rights or sovereignty should not 
be construed broadly.44 Accordingly, because civil remedies may 
interfere with the :ability of Indians to govern themselves, 45 thus 
violating treaty and sovereignty rights, a court should refuse to imply 
such a remedy unless the legislative history of the statute strongly 
supports implication. Even if the court determines that no treaty or 
sovereignty rights are involved, however, it should not imply civil 
remedies lightly. It should instead carefully balance the factors set 
forth by recent Supreme Court cases, 46 which include examination 
of congressional intent, and be extremely reluctant .to impinge upon 
the decision-making processes even of Indian governments that lack 
the protections of treaties or actual sovereignty. 
A. Treaty Rights 
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that treaties with 
Indian tribes bind the United States47 and preclude state action that 
violates treaty provisions. 48 Among the rights that have been guaran-
42. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
43. See text at notes 127-59 infra. 
44. See text at notes 47-126 infra. 
45. See text at notes 7-23 supra. 
46. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
47. See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 
187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903). 
48. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); United States 
v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). 
Treaties bind the United States and preclude inconsistent state action only in 
the absence of unilateral abrogation by Congress. See text at note 59 infra. 
218 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:210 
teed to signatory Indian tribes is the right of the ,tribe to control inter-
nal affairs solely through an Indian government. The provision of 
such rights is frequently explicit, 40 although the Supreme Court has 
held that they may be implicit within the terms of a treaty. In the 
1958 case of Williams v. Lee,50 for example, the Court reversed a 
state court order requiring an Indian to pay a debt incurred on the 
Navajo Reservation -to a White shop-owner doing business on the 
reservation. One ground on which the Court denied state court 
jurisdiction was that, 
[i]n return for. [Indian] promises to keep peace, this treaty "set apart" 
for "their permanent home" a portion of what had been their native 
country, and provided that no one, except U.S. Government person-
nel, was to enter the reserved area. Implicit in these treaty terms, 
as it was in the treaties with the Cherokees involved in Worcester v. 
Georgia, was the understanding that the internal affairs of the Indians 
remained exclusively within the jurisdiction of whatever tribal gov-
ernment exists.51 
The scope of the right to self-government implied by this treaty 
was reaffirmed and expanded in 1972 by the Supreme Court in 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission.52 The Court stated 
that "[t]he beginning of our analysis must be with the treaty which 
the United States Government entered with the Navajo nation in 
1868"53 and went on to hold -that ·the treaty barred the State of Ari-
zona from imposing an income tax upon Navajos residing on ,the 
reservation. 
Although most of the relevant cases have involved attempted state 
49. For example, the 1866 treaty with the Creek Indian Tribe provided for con-
gressional authority over the administration of justice and for the protection of 
property rights within Indian territory, subject to the proviso that "said legislation 
shall not in any manner interfere with or annul their present tribal organization, 
rights, laws, privileges, and customs." Treaty with the Creek Indians, June 14, 1866, 
art. X, 14 Stat. 785, 788 (1868). See ~lso 2 C. KAPPLER, INDIAN LAws AND 
TREATIES 702, 705 (1903). 
50. 358 U.S. 217 (1958). 
51. 358 U.S. at 221 (emphasis added). Because the Court in Williams ruled 
that implied treaty rights precluded the implication of state jurisdiction, the case 
does not directly settle the question of implied federal jurisdiction. However, the 
rationale of the Court-that the internal affairs of Indians remain within the juris-
diction of Indian governments absent express jurisdictional grants elsewhere by Con-
gress-also supports a prohibition on implied federal jurisdiction. See text at notes 
54-58 infra. The Court used the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970), 
which expressly grants jurisdiction to federal courts to hear cases involving enumer-
ated Indian offenses, as an example of an express congressional grant of jurisdiction 
over the internal affairs of Indians. It supports the conclusion that the Court in-
tended to prohibit implied federal jurisdiction as well as implied state jurisdiction. 
52. 411 U.S. 164, 173-75 (1973) ("it cannot be doubted that the reservation 
of certain lands for the exclusive use and occupancy of the Navajos and the ex-
clusion of non-Navajos from the prescribed area was meant to establish the land 
as within the exclusive sovereignty of the Navajos ... "). 
53. 411 U.S. at 174. See also Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 
96 S. Ct. 1634 (1976). 
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incursions upon Indian rights, the principles of law derived from them 
are also applicable to federal intrusions absent a finding of specific 
congressional intent to abrogate a treaty obligation. 54 Thus, in one 
case, ,the Supreme Court held that a .treaty transferring the fee to 
land "free of all charges or incumbrances whatsoever" exempted the 
land from federal taxation of timber sales.55 Recently, the Eighth 
Circuit held that an implicit treaty right for Indians ,to hunt on their 
reservation immunized them from prosecution for hunting bald eagles 
-an endangered species generally protected ·by statute. 56 Moreover, 
the implication of self-government rights against federal incursions 
is also supported by the Supreme Court's frequent assertion that "treat-
ies with the Indians must be interpreted as ,they would have under-
stood them."57 It is· difficult to see -how federal interference with 
internal Indian affairs would have ·been understood by Indian treaty 
signatories as less obnoxious than state interference. Few Indian 
nations, if any, would have construed their treaties to permit federal 
court review of actions -taken by their tribal governments. 58 The 
wording of treaties does not suggest that some rights are to receive 
fuller protection than oth{?rs, and treaty -rights to self-government are 
certainly no less deserving of respect than the right to hunt or im-
munity from •taxation. 
The existence of a treaty right, whether express or implied, does 
not, however, pose an absolute bar to congressional action in violation 
of .that right. It is well established that where a treaty and an aot of 
Congress -are in direct conflict, the later in date :prevails. 59 Thus, 
although the express -provisions of ICRA providing for habeas corpus 
review in the federal courts60 violate prior treaties granting the right 
of self-government, these provisions should be enforced. Before 
abrogating treaty rights, however, courts must carefully examine both 
the impact of the remedy on the right and the intent of Congress in 
enacting ICRA. 
Although the quantum of congressional intent that must be mani-
fested in a statute or its legislative history to support a finding of abro-
54. See note 51 supra. 
55. Squire v .. Copoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6 (1956). 
56. United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974). For a discussion 
of statutory abrogation of treaty rights, see text at notes 59-72 infra. 
57. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970). 
58. Some treaties indicate that the signatories understood that the United States 
would take control of internal Indian affairs. For example, the 1867 treaty with 
the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indian tribes provides that "[t]he United States may 
pass such laws o_n the subject of . . . the government of the Indians on said reserva-
tions ... as may be thought proper." Treaty with the Cheyenne Indians, Oct. 
28, 1867, art. VI, 15 Stat. 593, 595 (1869). However, such treaties have been 
criticized as having been negotiated with improper Indian parties. See P. FARB, 
MAN'S RISE TO ClvILIZATION AS SHOWN BY THE !NDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA 30 
(1968). 
59. See, e.g., United States v. Len Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213 (1902). 
60. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970); note 4 supra. 
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gation has not been uniformly defined, all of the courts have set up a 
heavy presumption against abrogation. 61 In fact, the Supreme Court 
has not found an Indian treaty to have been abrogated by less than 
express language· in the past fifty years. 62 In the leading case of 
Menominee Tribe v. United States,63 the Court considered whether a 
congressional act terminating federal supervision over an Indian 
tribe abrogated ,the hunting and fishing rights previously guaranteed 
by treaty. Despite the seemingly unequivocal language of the act 
that after termination of the reservation "the laws of the several states 
shall apply to ,the tribe and its members in the same manner as they 
apply to other citizens or persons within their jurisdiction,"04 the 
Court noted that the act did not explicitly terminate treaty rights66 
and, finding the legislative history to be ambiguous, 66 declined to 
construe the act "as a back-handed way" of achieving ,this result.61 
The Court went on to say that "[w]hile the power to abrogate those 
rights exists . . . 'the intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not 
to be lightly imputed to the Congress.' "68 
Although the Menominee Tribe opinion presents only a sparse 
analytical framework for ascertaining the precise level of express 
congressional intent needed to abrogate treaty rights, the case at the 
61. Courts use various expressions to describe the presumption against abroga-
tion. See Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: 
"As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time 
is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601, 623-28 (197S). A common formulation of the 
test is that abrogation shall not be "lightly implied." Id. at 62S. See, e.g., Squire 
v. Capoeman, 3S1 U.S. 1, 8 (19S6); Kimball v. Callahan, 493 F.2d S64, S68 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974); Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians 
v. Herbst, 334 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (D. Minn. 1971). However, the Supreme Court 
has recently shown a preference for the formulation that abrogation will be found 
"only upon a clear showing" of congressional intent. Wilkinson & Volkman, 
supra, at 623; see DeCoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 42S, 444 (197S); 
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, SOS (1973). Under either formulation of the test, 
it is clear that a court will find a treaty to have been abrogated by a statute only if 
the face of the statute or the surrounding circumstances and legislative history evi-
dence a congressional intent to abrogate. See Decoteau v. District County Ct., 420 
U.S. 425, 445 (1975) (face of statute, surrounding circumstances, and legislative his-
tory all clearly showed abrogative intent); Anderson v. Gladden, 293 F.2d 463, 466 
(9th Cir. 1961) (face of statute created strong implication of intent to abrogate). 
62. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 61, at 630. 
63. 391 U.S. 404 (1968). 
64. 391 U.S. at 410. 
65. 391 U.S. at 408. 
66. Senator Watkins, author of the bill in question, stated that the bill " 'in 
no way violate[s) any treaty obligation with this tribe.'" 391 U.S. at 413, quoting 100 
CONG. REC. 8538 (1954). However, "counsel for the Menominees spoke against 
the bill, arguing that' its silence would by implication abolish those hunting and 
fishing rights." 391 U.S. at 408, citing Joint Hearings on S. 2813, H.R. 2828, and 
H.R. 7135 Before Subcommittees of Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d 
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 6, at 697, 704 (1954). 
67. 391 U.S. at 412. 
68. 391 U.S. at 412-13, quoting Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138, 
160 (1934). 
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very least requires courts to analyze carefully the legislative history 
of acts that conflict with those rights and to find a strong legislative 
intent to support their abrogation. 69 More recently, the Eighth Cir-
cuit went even further in the case of United States v. White,70 where 
it considered whether the Bald Eagle Protection Act71 had implicitly 
repealed a treaty right to hunt. The court concluded that "[t]o affect 
those rights [by statute], it was incumbent upon Congress to expressly 
abrogate or modify the spirit of the relationship between the United 
States and Red Lake Chippewa Indians on their native reservation."72 
Finding no discussion in the legislative history of the intended effect 
of ,this Act on these specific treaty rights, 73 the court held that the 
treaty rights had not been modified. 
Despite ·the direct impact that implication of civil remedies for 
ICRA violations may have upon tribal self-govemment,74 courts 
implying such remedies have uniformly failed to examine the affected 
tribes' ,treaty rights and thus have not analyzed ICRA for th~ congres-
sional intent vis-a-vis those i-ights. If a treaty provides an Indian 
tribe with the rights of self-government, the principles set forth in 
Menominee Tribe should bar the implication of a civil remedy. The 
policy underlying the heavy presumption against abrogation is that, 
because of the sanctity of treaty obligations and their binding effect 
on the federal government, Congress should •be encouraged to delib-
erate fully on any measure that violates those obligations. Not only 
did Congress fail to provide expressly for civil remedies, but the 
l~gislative history75 is also devoid of any legislative consideration of 
the impact that authorization of such remedies would have on the 
ability of Indians to govern themselves, even though Congress did 
recognize that some treaty rights might ibe involved. 76 The reluctance 
69. A stricter test has been suggested: "Treaty rights should be abrogated only 
by an explicit congressional statement, both of the specific promises about to be 
broken and of the intent of Congress to break them." Wilkinson & Volkman, supra 
note 61, at 660-61. Titls test would assure congressional awareness of treaty 
breaches because abrogation could only be found from the face of a statute. 
70. 508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974). 
71. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1970) (amended 1972). 
72. 508 F.2d at 457-58 (emphasis added). 
73. 508 F.2d at 458. 
74. See text at notes 7-23 supra. 
75. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-124 (1969); 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 
pt. 4, at 815-905 (1963); 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1, 2, 3 (1962). 
76. ICRA was passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 
90-284, 82 Stat. 73, which also provided for riot control and which prohibited 
housing discrimination. The assassination of Martin Luther King created strong 
pressure to pass the entire Act quickly. · See 114 CONG. REc. 9553, 9615, 9620 
(1968). In this atmosphere, the Indian part of the bill was quickly put through 
committee, see Hearings on H.R. 15419 and Related Bills Before a Subcomm. on 
Indian Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 
2d Sess. 23, 40, 43 (1968), and the only congressional recognition of treaty rights 
occurred incidentally during an argument over whether ICRA should be attached to 
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of courts to -abrogate •treaty rights has actually led them to bend ex-
press statutory language to avoid abrogation. 77 Implication of a civil 
remedy by a federal court is a :radical departure from past practice. 
Although it must be recognized that ihe rights established by ICRA 
are important ones by Anglo-American legal standards, and ·are in-
deed binding on ,the tribal governments, it appears improper for a 
federal court to imply a civil remedy for a suit brought against an 
Indian nation -that has been guaranteed .by treaty the right to self-
government. 
B. Tribal Sovereignty 
Even in the absence of a treaty guaranteeing the right to self• 
government, •the courts have consistently recognized that Indian gov-
ernments possess some sovereignty with respect to internal tribal 
affairs.78 As early as 1831, the Supreme Court characterized the 
Cherokee Nation as "a state, as a district political society, separated 
from others, capable of managing its own affairs ·and governing it• 
self .. · .. "79 A year later, Chief Justice Marshall reaffirmed the 
sovereignty of the Cherokee Nation: 
The very fact of repeated treaties with them recognizes it; and the 
settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does 
not surrender its independence-its right to self-government, by 
associating with a stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state, 
in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the protec-
tion of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of 
government, and ceasing to be a state.80 
These principles have been repeatedly acknowledged in subsequent 
federal case Iaw,81 and as recently as 1975 the Supreme Court again 
the Civil Rights Act, see 114 CoNG. R.Ec. 5837 (1968), rather than as an expression 
of congressional intent to abrogate treaty rights. 
77. See, e.g., Frost v. Wenie, 157 U.S. 46, 58 (1895); United States v. White, 
508 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974); Bennet County v. United States, 394 F.2d 8 (8th 
Cir. 1968); United States v. Cutler, 37 F. Supp. 724 (D. Idaho 1941). 
78. Tribal "immunity" from the application of federal or state law based upon 
tribal sovereignty should not be confused with the narrower issue of tribal im-
munity from suit based upon -traditional notions of sovereign immunity. Sovereign 
immunity operates as a defense to an alleged claim based on applicable law. For 
discussions of Indian sovereign immunity, which could also raise a bar to civil 
actions under ICRA, see United States v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 
309 U.S. 506 (1940); M. PRICE, supra note 26, at 747-48; Zionitz, supra note 25. 
Tribal immunity operates to render inapplicable the law upon which a claim is based, 
Tribal sovereignty over internal Indian affairs includes the power to define forms ot 
government, to tax, to regulate domestic relations, and to administer criminal justice 
in many types of cases. For discussions of internal tribal sovereignty, see F. CoHEN, 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 122-50 (1942); M. PRICE, supra note 26, at 
118-82. 
79. Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 11 (1831). 
80. Worchester v. State of Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (emphasis 
added). 
81. See, e.g., Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 
November 1976] Implication of Civil Remedies 223 
recognized that Indian nations were "unique aggregations possessing 
attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory."82 
The existence of tribal sovereignty does not preclude congressional 
action that violates it. Indeed, the powers of Indian governments 
have often been limited by Congress pursuant to the wardship 
power.83 As with treaty rights, however, the courts have held that 
Indian nations retain sovereignty over internal affairs except where 
expressly qualified by a congressional act. 
The Supreme Court recognized the -existence of this "express 
qualification" requirement in Williams v. Lee,84 in which a state 
court was attempting to exercise jurisdiction over a member of an 
Indian nation. After noting that non-Indians could be prosecuted 
in a state court for a crime against a non-Indian on a reservation, 
the Court stated that, as a general proposition, if the crime was by 
or against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that expressly conferred on 
other Courts by Congress has remained exclusive."85 As an ex-
ample of this proposition the Court referred to the Major Crimes 
Act, 86 which expressly grants federal court jurisdiction over certain 
crimes committed by Indians. 87 
This "express qualification" requirement has been directly ap-
plied to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts over Indians. In Dicke 
v. Cheyenne-Arapahoe Tribes,88 for example, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals noted that a statute ceding land to the Cheyenne-
Arapahoe Tribe could be interpreted as impliedly authorizing In-
dians to sue their tribal governments in federal court. 89 The court 
then went on to say: 
Traditionally, however, and in recognition of the fact that the power 
to regulate Indian affairs lies exclusively with Congress and not the 
courts, such statutes have been strictly construed. In [a previous 
case], we indicated that express authorization was necessary to over-
come the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes ·. . . . Again and 
recently this court has held that federal court jurisdiction does not 
131, 133-34 (10th Cir. 1959); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 92-93 
(8th Cir. 1956); United States v. Consolidated Wounded Knee Cases, 389 F. Supp. 
235, 237 (D. Neb. & D. S.D. 1975). 
82. United States v. Mazurine, 419 U.S. 544, 5557 (1975). 
83. A principle of international law, the doctrine of wardship between nations 
describes the relationship between conquering and dependent nations and has been 
used by the Supreme Court to describe the relationship between the United States and 
Indian nations. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (I-886); Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). For a discussion of the wardship 
doctrine as applied to Indians, see F. COHEN, supra note 78, at 169-73. 
84. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). For a discussion of the treaty aspects of Williams, 
see text at notes 50-51 supra. 
85. 358 U.S. at 220 (emphasis added). 
86. 18 u.s.c. § 1153 (1970). 
87. 358 U.S. at 220 n.5. See also note 51 supra. 
88. 304 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1962). 
89. 304 F.2d at 114. 
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lie in a matter of controversy between Indians and the Tribe "unless 
jurisdiction is expressly conferred by congressional enactment."90 
Since the statute in the case at bar did not contain an express au-
thorization of jurisdiction, the suit was dismissed. 
Thus, the state of federal Indian law as described in 1940 by 
Felix Cohen, a noted authority on Indian law, remains the same today: 
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal 
powers is marked by adherence to three fundamental principles: 
( 1 ) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of 
any sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to the 
legislative power of the United States and, in substance, terminates 
the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter 
into treaties with foreign nations, but does not by iself affect the in-
ternal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local self-govern-
ment. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties and 
by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly quali-
fied, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian 
tribes and in their duly constituted organs of government. 91 
By allowing ICRA civil suits, courts have for the first time, by impli-
cation of a statute, deprived an Indian nation of an aspect of sover--
eignty. 02 Given the degree of infringement presented by civil suits 
90. 304 F.2d at 114-15 (citations omitted). 
91. F. COHEN, supra note 78, at 123. 
92. A recent Supreme Court decision has reduced the geographic area within a 
tribal government's jurisdiction on the basis of implications derived from a con-
gressional statute. Decoteau v. District County Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975). If such 
a reduction constitutes deprivation of an aspect of internal Indian sovereignty, then 
DeCoteau represents a second instance of infringement through implication. 
Indian country, over which Indian tribes have jurisdiction, includes "all land 
within the limits of any Indian reservation . • . and all Indian allotments, the Indian 
titles to which have not been extinguished .... " 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970). In 
DeCoteau, South Dakota courts asserted jurisdiction over Indian acts done on lands 
within a reservation created by treaty in 1867, but owned and settled by non-
Indians since 1891. The issue was whether the Act of March 3, 1891, c.543, 26 Stat. 
1035, which ratified an agreement between the United States and the Sisseton-
Wahpeton Tribe .under which the tribe sold to the United States their unallotted 
land, terminated the reservation status of that land and thus exposed it to state juris-
diction under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970). The Court held the reservation status to 
have been terminated despite the absence of express language to that effect in 
the Act. 
Decoteau, however, does not provide support for implying civil remedies under 
ICRA. First, the implication of civil remedies under ICRA directly interferes with 
powers of tribal sovereignty, see text at notes 7-23 supra, while DeCoteau affects 
only the georgraphical scope within which powers of tribal sovereignty may be 
exercised. 
Second, the Court found the reservation status to have been terminated only 
after finding evidence of congressional intent sufficient to override the presumption 
against abrogation of treaties by statute. See note 61 supra. As has been noted, 
no evidence exists concerning congressional intent in ICRA sufficient to override 
the presumption against treaty abrogation. See note 76 supra & text at notes 75-76 
supra. There is, therefore, inadequate justification for interference with tribal 
sovereignty. 
Finally, the Court in Decoteau emphasized that the Act was "not a unilateral 
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upon internal Indian affairs, 93 and recognizing that the Senate sub-
committee that drafted ICRA recognized that Indian sovereignty 
may be qualified only by express legislation, 94 this departure from 
precedent is unwarranted. 
Underlying the "express qualification" requirement are important 
principles of judicial review and separation of powers. Weighing 
most heavily against implication is the doctrine that Indian policy 
should be made solely by the political branches of government. In 
the landmark reapportionment case of Baker v. Carr, 95 the Court de-
fined the contours of the political question doctrine96 and discussed 
the influence of this doctrine in limiting the extent of the judiciary's 
role in Indian affairs. 97 Several of the features enumerated by the 
Court are present in the implication of a civil remedy that infringes 
upon Indian sovereignty. 
In United States v. Consolidated Wounded Knee Cases,98 the 
court, without referring to Baker and without expressly mentioning 
the political question doctrine, used an analysis similar to that man-
dated by Baker. In this case the criminal defendants argued, inter 
alia, that Indian sovereignty barred federal jurisdiction over alleged 
crimes by Indians on a reservation. 99 In upholding federal juris-
diction, the court recognized that the Constitution requires commit-
ment of Indian matters to the political branches of the govemment,1°0 
action by Congress but the ratification of a previously negotiated agreement, to 
which a tribal majority consented." 420 U.S. at 448. In contrast, ICRA was not 
formally approved by the Indian nations affected by its enactment, and many Indian 
leaders oppose ICRA. See Coulter, supra note 6, at 50. 
93. See text at notes 7-23 supra. 
94. See SUBCOMM. ON CONSTlTUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON nm 
JUDICL\RY, 88m CONG., 2D SESS., CoNSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF TilE AMERICAN INDIAN 
4 (Comm. Print 1964). 
95. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
96. 369 U.S. at 217: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found 
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stand-
ards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility 
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the 
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for un-
questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality 
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on 
one question. 
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there 
should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political ques-
tion's presence. 
97. 369 U.S. at 215. 
98. 389 F. Supp. 235, 239 (D. Neb. & D.S.D. 1975). 
99. 389 F. Supp. atJ 236. 
100. 389 F. Supp. at 239: 
[I']he people of the United States have not given me or any other judge the 
power to set national policy for them. By the Constitution the people have 
assigned governmental powers and have set their limits. Relations with Indian 
tribes are given exclusively to the executive and legislative branches. Perhaps 
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and, hence, that the court must look to the legislative and executive 
branches to define the limits on federal incursion into Indian affairs. 
Although the specific result in Wounded Knee did not restrict inter-
vention in internal Indian affairs, the case nonetheless stands for the 
proposition that since policy-making in Indian affairs belongs ex-
clusively to the political branches of government, the courts should 
be reluctant to construe ·a statute in a manner that expands the role 
of the judiciary in Indian affairs. The pervasive role that some courts 
have assumed in allowing civil challenges to the actions of an Indian 
government is directly contrary to this proposition. 
The underlying reason for such reluctance, according to the 
Wounded Knee court, is that "legislative bodies have investigative 
tools for listening to a wider community than do courts for ferreting 
out the deeper consciousness of the body politic," and those who are 
elected represent "an amalgam of many . . . [that] is more likely to 
reflect the conscience and wisdom of the people than a few who are 
appointed."101 The problems of how to define the rights of individual 
Indians within the tribal context and how best to protect those rights 
are best left to the Congress. 
Baker v. Carr states that courts must not deviate from adherence 
to a political decision already made102 by the Congress in the area 
of Indian affairs and should not make decisions that may be 
"hampered by . . . possible interference with a Congressional pro-
gram. "103 The currently stated policy of Congress104 and of the 
executive branch105 is that Indian sovereignty should be enhanced; 
ICRA itself establishes a policy of consultation with Indians before 
any action is taken that will affect them.100 Such policies are pre-
dicated upon a long history of conflict and negotiation. As the court 
stated in the Wounded Knee cases: 
[R]elations with American Indians are rooted in international rela-
tions . . . , including the laws of conquest and of treaties developed 
over centuries, not by courts, but by executive heads of nations 
through negotiations. The United States in its early history accepted 
in its dealings with other nations the European concepts. Perhaps 
it should not have done so in its relations with the American Indians. 
it should be otherwise, but it is not. When and if the people amend the Consti-
tution to put limits on the executive and legislative branches in their affairs with 
Indian tribes, the federal courts will uphold those limits, but in the meantime 
the courts cannot create limits. In short, a judge must hold government to 
the standards of the nation's conscience once declared, but he cannot create the 
conscience or declare the standards (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
101. 389 F. Supp. at 239. 
102. 369 U.S. at 2.17. 
103. 369 U.S. at 215-16 n.43. 
104. S. Con. Res. 26, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNo. REC. 46383 (1971). 
See also S. 2010, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1975). 
105. Message on American Indians by President Nixon, July 8, 1970, in M. 
PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 597 (1973). 
1Q6. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1321(a), 1322(c) (1970). 
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But it did. Changing now, after nearly two centuries, is a matter of 
massive public policy for broader exploration than courts are able 
to provide. Essentially, the issues here have to do with the methods 
of shifting power from one group to another-by· war, threat of war, 
economic pressure or indictment, verbal persuasion, election, agree-
ment, or gradual legislative encroachment. The acceptability of each 
method should be decided by the citizenry at large, which speaks 
directly or through its elected representatives.107 
Absent any express Congressional determination to the contrary, the 
courts should conclude that the judicial branch is the improper forum 
for obtaining relief for a grievance involving the sovereignty of an 
Indian nation.108 
Before such a conclusion can be reached, however, the threshold 
question at this stage of analysis-whether the Indian nation possesses 
requisite sovereignty-must be decided. -It will not always be true 
that an Indian tribe posesses the degree of sovereignty necessary to 
set up a bar to the imposition of "foreign" jurisdiction over the In-
dians absent express federal legislation. In Oklahoma Tax Commis-
sion v. United States109 the Supreme Court was faced with the ques-
tion whether Oklahoma state inheritance laws applied to income that 
Indians received from oil wells. Noting that the Oklahoma Indians did 
not live on reservations and that they held their land in fee, the Court 
rejected the claini that all Indians are exempt from taxation: 
The underlying principles on which these decisions are based do no~ 
fit the situation of the Oklahoma Indians. Although there are rem-
nants of the form of tribal sovereignty, these Indians have no effective 
tribal autonomy . . . ; they are actually citizens of the State with 
little to distinguish them from all other citizens except for their limited 
property restrictions and their tax exemptions.11° 
The Court •then proceeded to .find state jurisdiction to impose a tax 
on the basis of traditional, non-Indian rules for analysis of legislative 
history and statutory construction.111 
Similarly, not all Indian governments have been found to possess 
the requisite degree of sovereignty to support a bar to federal court 
jurisdiction over suits against them. In the 1965 case of Colli/ lower 
v. Garland,112 for example, a federal court found jurisdiction to hear 
107. 389 F. Supp. at 239. 
108. Cases in which implied remedies are sought under ICRA may present 
the federal courts with such quesmons as whether electricity should be introduced 
into cultural and religious areas of a Pueblo. See Peoples Committee v. Tribal 
Council, Civil No. 75-393 (D. N.M., filed July 9, 1975). These seem to be the kinds 
of issues to which the Supreme Court in Baker was referring when it stated that 
if courts are "hampered by problems of the management of unusual evidence," 
they should rely on congressional determination. 369 U.S. at 215-16 n.43. 
109. 319 U.S. 598 (1943). ' 
110. 319 U.S. at 603 (citations omitted). 
111. The Court did not require an express statement of congressional in-
tent to rescind the tax exemption generally possessed by Indians. 
112. 342 F.2d 36!> (9th Cir. 1965). 
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a habeas corpus action by an :J;ndian imprisoned by an Indian gov-
ernment. The court found the sovereignty bar to federal court re-
view inapplicable to the Gros Ventres Indians because of the perva-
sive federal presence in the Indian courts: "Under these circum-
stances, we think that these courts function in part as a federal agency 
and in part as a tribal agency, and that consequently it is competent 
for a federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding to inquire into the 
legality of the detention of an Indian pursuant .to ·an order of an Indian 
_court."113 Neither the Oklahoma Tax Commission nor the Colli-
flower courts found that the statute or remedy involved overrode In-
dian sovereignty. They instead determined that the Indian nations in-
volved lacked sovereignty, 114 apparently on the theory that the absence 
of a truly independent tribal government created an expectation that 
the government would operate pursuant to external regulation. 
Several major factors are crucial to the determination of inde-
pendence. The· most important is whether the Indian tribe retains 
its traditional form of government or has been reorganized pursuant 
to a federal statute.115 Governments based on traditional Indian 
culture should not be seen as "a part of a federal agency" over which 
federal courts have jurisdiction, but those organized pursuant to a 
federal statute116 may be in a much different position. Many such 
governments operate under constitutions drafted by the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA),117 which often provide for review and approval 
of tribal ordinances by the Secretary of Interior118 and for adherence 
to the United States Constitution and federal law.119 
Although federally reorganized Indian governments have ob-
viously relinquished some degree of their sovereignty, a court should 
not mechanically conclude that these governments are "federal agen-
cies" subject to federal judicial review. The extent to which the 
113. 342 F.2d at 379. 
114. In Colli/lower, the Gros Ventres Indians had been organized pursuant to 
the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-92 (1970), which subjected 
their bylaws and constitution to approval by the Secretary of the Interior. 25 
U.S.C. § 476 (1970). Also, Indian prisoners were confined in a county jail by 
contract between the federal and county government. 342 F.2d at 374. , 
115. Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court, 419 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1969). There 
are 485 federally recognized Indian governments. The organizational structures of 
52 have been federally approved though not authorized by statute. In addition, 
224 traditional Indian governments have been federally recognized without any formal 
federal approval of their organizational structures. See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 
ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS OF FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIAN ENTITIES (1975). 
116. See Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1970). 
117. See SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SENATE CoMM. ON nm 
JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., supra note 94, at 4. 
118. See Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act 
of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REv. 955, 968, 976-77 (1972). Amendments to constitutions 
drafted by the BIA require approval by the Secretary of Interior. 25 U.S.C. § 
476 (1970). 
119. See SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON TIIB 
JUDICIARY, supra note 94, at 5. 
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continuing tribal governmental process is actually intertwined with 
federal action must be considered. Secretarial approval is not neces-
sarily evidence of a continual involvement of federal instrumentalities 
in the Indian government's conduct of affairs. Approval may some-
times be granted automatically, and Indian governments may, on 
occasion, simply ignore the requirement and not submit tribal actions 
for such review.120 Additionally, efforts of a tribe to amend its 
constitution to restrict secretarial review, affirmative tribal reaction 
to a statute authorizing Indian governments to assume supervision of 
BIA employees, 121 an insubstantial role of the Commissioner of In-
dian Affairs in the tribal government, 122 and a limited reliance of the 
tribe on BIA funding of reservation activities123 all should be per-
suasive evidence that the tribal government is not in fact acting "in 
part as a federal agency." · 
A second factor that should be considered in determining tribal 
independence is the degree to which the Indian tribe has retained 
its traditional language, religion, and culture. Traditional Indians 
are less likely to have an expectation of federal regulation of their 
internal tribal customs. Even where departures from traditional 
customs exist, however, courts should not exaggerate their importance, 
since Indians are frequently less concerned with rigidly preserving 
particular forms or practices than they are with being permitted to 
evolve in a distinctly Indian manner, free from outside interference.124' 
Finally, the Indian nation's attitude toward federal domination 
should be examined. Passage by the tribal council of a resolution 
condemning the Indian policy of the United States as colonialist125 
and active opposition by the Indian government to the enactment of 
ICRA are evidence that there is neither an expectation nor an accept-
ance of operating pursuant to federal regulation. 
Although no formulation may be presented by which a· federal 
court can precisely ascertain the extent of sovereignty possessed by 
an Indian tribe, a court should at least weigh these factors before 
considering the implication of a civil remedy under ICRA. If the 
Indian nation is found to possess a degree of sovereignty sufficient to 
support the conclusion that it expects to conduct its internal affairs free 
120. AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INDIAN TRmES AS GOVERN-
MENTS 135, 138-39 (June ed. 1975). 
121. 25 u.s.c. § 48 (1970). 
122. See Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 374 (9th Cir. 1965). Appoint-
ment of a chief of an Indian government by the 'President further evidences extensive 
federal involvement. See Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674,677 (10th Cir. 1971). 
123. See Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1965). 
124. See v. DELORIA, BEHIND nm TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES 7, 206 (1974); 
Chambers & Price, Regulating Sovereignty: Secretarial Discretion and the Leasing 
of Indian Lands, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1061, 1080 (1974) •. 
125. Resolution of March 26, 1974, Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Council and 
Resolution of Feb. 16, 1975, Pitt River Tribal Council, in Minutes to the Conference 
on International Law of the International Indian Treaty Council (Feb. 21, 1975). 
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from federal regulation, then no civil remedy should be implied 
under ICRA.126 
C. Implying a Civil Remedy 
Even if an Indian tribe possesses neither treaty rights nor a 
requisite degree of sovereignty to bar the implication of civil remedies 
under ICRA, a civil remedy still should not be lightly implied by 
a federal court. The Supreme Court has developed a framework 
of analysis for implied remedies in several areas of non-Indian law 
that provides a suitable starting point for assessing the desirability 
of implication under ICRA. The analysis provides for consideration 
of a number of policy issues already raised concerning Indian law 
that should persuade courts to refrain from exceeding the express 
provisions of the Act. 
This framework was 1'ecently summarized and applied in Cort v. 
Ash.121 At issue in Cort was whether a penal statute prohibiting 
campaign contributions by corporations128 would support a share-
holder's civil action to secure derivative damage relief against cor-
porate directors for violation of that statute. The Supreme Court 
delineated four factors relevant to a determination of whether a 
court should imply a private remedy for a statute: 
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the 
statute was enacted," ... that is, does the statute create a federal 
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of 
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy 
or to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent with the underlying pur-
poses of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plain-
tiff? ... And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated 
to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that 
126. Many of the courts implying a civil remedy under ICRA have done so only 
after requiring an exhaustion of tribal remedies. See, e.g., O'Neal v. Cheyenne River 
Sioux, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1973); White v. Tribal Council, 383 F. Supp. 810 
(D. Minn. 1974). While this practice may reduce the infringement of treaty rights 
and Indian sovereignty, it fails to protect fully Indian autonomy for two reasons. 
First, the presumption against treaty abrogation, see text at notes 61-62 supra, and 
the express qualification requirement, see text at notes 83-90 supra, mandate that the 
Congress actually considers treaty rights and Indian sovereignty when passing legis-
lation and, thus, guarantee Indians an opportunity to apply political pressure to prevent 
congressional imposition of Anglo legal values. Requiring exhaustion of Indian 
remedies fails to present such a political opportunity. 
Second, requiring exhaustion of Indian remedies only delays interference with 
tribal rule; tribal governments are still under pressure to follow federal law to avoid 
the embarrassment of being reversed. See Janis v. Wilson, 521 F.2d 724, 729 (8th 
Cir. 1915). This pressure is eliminated by the presumption against abrogation and 
the express qualification requirement, which isolate a sphere of exclusive tribal juris-
diction. 
127. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
128. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (amended 1972 & 1974). 
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it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on 
federal law?129 
It will now be shown that both the legislative history of ICRA and 
the traditional policy of federal abstention from internal Indian affairs 
support the conclusion that no civil remedy should be implied from 
ICRA. 
A review of the legislative history indicates that criminal defend-
ants constituted the class of persons for whose especial benefit ICRA 
was enacted. First, the focus of the hearings carried on for the five 
years preceding the Act's passage was on the deprivation of rights 
within the Indian criminal justice system.130 Second, the testimony 
of Senator Ervin, chairman of the subcommittee that considered the 
legislation, emphasizes criminal proceedings: "The first title makes 
the Bill of Rights applicable to an Indian when he is charged with a 
crime by a tribal court, thus assuring the Indian citizen the basic 
rights and privileges in his relationship with his trj.bal government 
that every other American citizen now has in his relationship with 
his State, local and Federal Govemments."131 Finally, these indica-
tions of intent drawn from the congressional record are reinforced 
by general rules of construction and by a look at the context in which 
ICRA was passed. Thus, the familiar canon of statutory construc-
tion, that expressio unius est exclusius alterius, 132 suggests .that be-
cause habeas corpus was the sole express remedy in ICRA, 133 and 
was viewed as an effective enforcement mechanism, 134 it should be 
construed as the only intended remedy. 
This interpretation is reinforced by a glance at other civil rights 
legislation. The Fair Housing Act, for example, with which ICRA 
was passed, specifically established a civil remedy,135 while the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, prohibiting discrimination in places of public ac-
commodation, expressly provided that either the Attorney General136 
129. 422 U.S. at 78, quotil)g Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 
(1916) (emphasis added by Court). 
130. See authorities cited note 75 supra. 
131. Hearings on H.R. 15419 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the 
House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 90-23, at 
132 (1968). See 113 CONG. REC. 35474 (1967) (remarks of Senator Ervin). Such 
a specific statement by Senator Ervin seems far more indicative of legislative intent 
than do general remarks made by him concerning the expansion of constitutional 
rights. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REC. 35,472 (1967). For another statement of a con-
gressman emphasizing criminal proceedings, see 114 CoNG. REC. 9596 (1968) (re-
marks of Congressman Meeds). 
132. See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of R.R. Passen-
gers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) ("A frequently stated principle of statutory construc-
tion is that when legislation expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, 
courts should not expand the coverage of the statute ·to subsume other remedies"). 
133. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970) reprinted in note 4 supra. 
134. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 9552-53 (1968) (remarks of Congressman Reifel). 
135. 42 u.s.c. § 3612 (1970). 
136. 42 u.s.c. § 2000a-5 (1970). 
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or private parties137 could bring sui_ts in federal courts for injunctive 
relief.138 Moreover, Congress demonstrated its awareness of the 
potential intrusiveness of ICRA into Indian sovereignty by taking 
no action on both a bill providing for a trial de novo in federal court 
for the deprivation of civil rights139 and a provision to allow the Attor-
ney General to bring civil or criminal actions to vindicate Indian 
rights. 14° Congress showed its concern with the scope of federal 
court intervention into Indian affairs and limited the available remedy 
accordingly.141 
In fact, an underlying purpo.c;e of ICRA, in addition to the pro-
tection of criminal plaintiffs, was •the promotion of the sovereignty 
of Indian governments. This concern is clearly reflected in Title IV 
of the Act.142 Under congressional authorization prior to ICRA, 
states did not need the consent of the tribes to .assume both civil and 
criminal jurisdiction over Indians.143 Title IV was .a response by 
Congress to bitter Indian complaints concerning the exercise of state 
jurisdiction.144 It made consent of the involved Indian government 
a prerequisite to .further state assumption of criminal145 or civil juris-
diction146 and authorized states to retrocede previously assumed juris-
diction over Indians.147 This provision, in conjunction with Title 
ill of the Act, which ,provides that proper qualifications of judges in 
-tribal courts and a ,waining program for tribal judges be established, 148 
demonstrates that a major purpose of ICRA is to revest authority to 
the tribes and to upgrade tribal courts.149 · 
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1970). 
138. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 3(a)-(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(a)-(c) 
(1970 & Supp. 1975) also expressly provides for civil remedies. 
139. See S. 962, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). The bill never emerged from 
committee. See also Lazarus, Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian Bill 
of Rights, 45 N.D.L. REV. 337, 347 (1969). But see Brunett, An Historical Analysis 
of the 1968 "Indian Civil Rights" Act, 9 HARV. J. l..EG1s. 557, 602 (1972). 
140. See S. 963, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (the bill never emerged from 
committee); Zionitz, supra note 25, at 13-14. 
141. In the 1969 hearings on S. 211, which contained identical language to 
Title II of ICRA and would have amended ICRA in other respects, Senator Ervin, 
in addressing the scope of federal review of civil and criminal trials, remarked: 
"The only provision in this bill that provides for federal court interference is writ 
of habeas corpus .••. " Hearings on S. 211 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1969). 
142. 25 u.s.c. §§ 1321-26 (1970). ' 
143. M. PRICE, supra note 26, at 103-04, 213-18. 
144. SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON TIIE JUDICIARY, 
supra note 94, at 9-14. 
145. 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1970). 
146. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970). 
147. 25 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1970). 
148. 25 u.s.c. § 1311(3)-(4) (1970). 
149. Attributing to ICRA the purpose of fostering Indian sovereignty places 
ICRA harmoniously within the broadly stated national policy of Indian self-deter-
mination. See Message on American Indians by President Nixon, supra note 105 
("The time has come to break decisively with the past and to create the conditions 
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Not only :is the implication of civil remedies contrary to the pur-
pose of fostering Indian self-determination, but such implication is 
not necessary .to protect the rights created by ICRA. Courts sug-
gesting that failure to imply a civil remedy would render the Act 
unenforceable and ineffectual are in error.15° First, those provisions 
that guarantee rights :to criminal defendants151 may be enforced by 
the express habeas corpus action.152 Moreover, normally e~pansive 
constitutional provisions such ,as the due process and equal ,protec-
tion clauses, 153 -though limited if applica:ble only in ha:beas corpus 
proceedings, would effectively guarantee rights of the criminally 
accused. Second, even if such constitutional provisions as ,the right 
to free speech154 and the prohibition on the taking of property without 
just compensation155 cannot be fully enforceable in federal courts 
•through a habeas corpus proceeding, these -rights may still be en-
forceable in Indian courts.156 Tribes organized under the federal 
reorganization act157 often have provisions in their constitutions that 
incorporate into Indian jurisprudence rights created under federal 
statute.158 Tribal courts are .the most desirable forum for accommo-
for a new era in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and Indian 
decisions"); S. Con. Res. 26, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNG. REC. 46383 ( 1971): 
That it is the sense of Congress that (1) our national Indian policy shall give 
full recognition to and be predicated upon the unique relationship that exists be-
tween this group of citizens and the Federal Government and that a govern-
ment wide commitment shall derive from this relationship that will be designed 
to give Indians the freedom and encouragement to develop their individual, 
family, and community potential and to determine their own future to the 
maximum extent possible . • . (3) improving the quality and quantity of social 
and economic development efforts for Indian people and maximizing opportuni-
ties for Indian control and self-determination shall be a major goal of our na-
tional Indian policy (emphasis added). 
150. See, e.g., Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 1973}; Luxon 
v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 455 F.2d 698, 700 (8th Cir. 1972); Loncassion v. Leekity, 
334 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D.N.M. 1971). See also de Raismes, supra note 112, at 91; 
Comment, supra note 25, at 1371. 
151. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(2) (1970) (search and seizure); 25 U.S.C. § 1302(3) 
(1970) (double jeopardy); 25 U.S.C. § 1302(4) (1970) (self-incrimination); 2S 
U.S.C. § 1302(6) (1970) (speedy trial, compulsory process, information as to nature 
of accusation); 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1970) (bail, excessive fines and imprisonment, 
cruel and unusual punishment); 25 U.S.C. § 1302(10) (1970) (right to jury trial); 
note 3 supra. 
152. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970) reprinted in note 4 supra. 
153. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970) reprinted in note 3 supra. 
154. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (1970) reprinted in note 3 supra. 
155. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(5) (1970) reprinted in note 3 supra. 
156. Zionitz, supra note 25, at 8; see legal memorandum of Mr. Kent Frizzell, the 
Solicitor to the Interior .Department, to tbe Department of Justice, May 22, 1974, 
at 10-11, quoted in Zionitz, supra note 25, at 9 n.33: "Nor would [failure to imply 
remedies beyond habeas corpus] . . . render meaningless the substantive provisions of 
section 1302. Those provisions clearly bind tribal courts as well as all other tribal 
officers, and in addition bind the Secretary of the Interior in the exercise of his 
supervisory control over certain types of tribal action." 
157. 25 u.s.c. §§ 461-79 (1970). 
158. See SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OP SE.NATE COMM. ON nm JU-
DICIARY, supra note 94, at 5. 
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dating Anglo-American rights with ,traditional Indian oulture.1110 
Thus, courts implying civil remedies have ignored the emphasis 
on criminal justice and -the sensitivity -to sovereignty that indicate 
congressional intent to provide federal court review only to the extent 
.that criminal rights :were at stake. The dual, and sometimes con-
flicting, purposes of ICRA in fostering Indian self-determination and 
yet protecting tlie rights of Indians vis-a-vis their tribal governments 
-are 1best effectuated by limiting federal judicial intervention to the 
sole remedy of habeas corpus.160 
This conclusion remains unchanged after consideration of the 
fuial factor deemed relevant in Cort-whether "the cause of action 
[is] one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the 
concern of the States .... "161 Indian tribes have jurisdiction over 
their internal affairs162 analogous to that possessed by the states.183 
With the exception of recent cases in which courts have implied civil 
remedies for violations of ICRA, federal courts have assumed an 
adjudicatory role over internal Indian controversies only where there 
was an express congressional mandate164 or where Indian sovereignty 
had already been substantially diminished.165 
There is simply no basis in precedent for the federal courts to 
imply such civil remedies, and the policy considerations that have 
countenanced judicial restraint :remain persuasive. First, the legisla-
,tive and executive -branches have traditionally defined the relation-
ship of the federal government to the Indians;106 these branches are 
most qualified to weigh the consequences of any measure affecting 
tribal independence. The implication of civil remedies for ICRA 
not only portends fundamental changes in Indian government but 
may also place substantial financial burdens upon the tribes, both 
in ,the cost of litigation167 and the potential for damages.108 Most 
Indian nations ,are not wealthy, 169 and their income is allocated to 
ibenefit rthe entire tribe. Given ·the limited ability of tribes to bear 
increased financial burdens, the imposition of civil remedies may 
very well lead -to a loss of jobs and services in the Indian commu-
nity.110 
159. See text at notes 171-72 infra. 
160. But see Comment, supra note 25, at 1371. 
161. 422 U.S. at 78. 
162. See text at notes 47-58 supra. 
163. Cf. Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe, 66 F. 372 (8th Cir. 1895). 
164. See text at notes 84-91 supra. 
165. See text at notes 109-26 supra. 
166. See text at notes 95-107 supra. 
167. See, e.g., AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER ASSOCIATION, supra note 6, at 55. 
See also Thebo v. Choctaw Tribe, 66 F. 372, 376 (8th Cir. 1895). 
168. See, e.g., Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D.N.M. 1971 ). 
169. See A. JosEPHY, RED POWER; THE AMERICAN INDIANS FIGHT FOR FREEDOM 
3 (1971). 
170. See Zionitz supra note 25, at 33-34. 
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A second, and more important, policy reason for preserving 
tribal courts as the forums for ,adjudicating individual rights is the 
inherent ethnocentrism of ,the federal courts. Concepts of law within 
the federal judiciary are ,based primarily upon Anglo-American legal 
principles. When conflicts -are brought into a federal court, issues 
will be framed •according to these principles and may ignore incom-
patible traditions -that have legitimacy among the Indian people.171 
If Indian .customs are ,to withstand the pressures exerted by the Anglo-
American system of law, great sensitivity to Indian culture will be 
necessary-sensitivity that would clear~y be mq_re available in tribal 
courts. The wholesale exposure of tribal governmental systems to 
a culturally removed federal judiciary is an extreme and momentous 
development; it should not come about through implication from 
a statute ,that merely represents .the initial e~tension by Congress of 
the federal judicial power into tribal government.172 
The trend in federal Indian law since the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934173 has been to allow increasing tribal autonomy. Stat-
utes have, for instance, authorized Indian nations to take control of 
BIA employees.174 A primary purpose of ICRA itself is to enhance 
the prospects of Indian sovereignty.175 The Act provides for retro-
cession of ourrently held state authority over Indian nations.176 and 
requires consent of Indian ,tribes prior to any expansion of such 
authority.177 Coupled with a growing consciousness ·among Indians 
of the values in ,their traditional culture, such statutes may even allow 
Indian nations currently considered "a part of a federal agency" to 
regain itheir sovereignty. Absent congressional mandate, -the courts 
should ibe reluctant to interfere with the evolution of Indian govern-
ments that Congress is presently supervising. 
171. See Peoples Committee v. Tribal Council, Civil No. 75-393 (D.N.M., filed 
July 9, 1975) (issue of whether Tribal Council can prohibit the installation of elec-
tricity because of religious principles was argued on basis of "spot-zoning" precedents). 
See also Hearings on S. 211 Before Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., lst.Sess. 29 (1969) (testimony of Benny Aten-
cio on behalf of the Santa Domingo Pueblo and the Indian Pueblo Council): 
Procedural protections of due process may vary from one social context to 
another. As an example: separation of powers is a basic principle in the 
Government of the United States. At Santa Domingo our tribal council acts as 
a legislature, a court, and the executive. 
I could go on pointing out disparities but it is obvious that your way of life 
is different from ours. The things you value, that which make life meaningful 
to you are not the same with us in many respects. But we respect your beliefs. 
We ask nothing more in return. 
172. See generally M. •PRicE, supra note 26, at 749. 
173. 25 u.s.c. §§ 461-79 (1970). 
174. 25 u.s.c. § 48 (1970). 
175. See text at notes 142-49 supra. 
176. 25 u.s.c. § 1323 (1970). 
177. 25 u.s.c. §§ 1321, 1322 (1970). 
